Before accepting this picture of most of us as conniving, power-hungry people, gleefully memorizing dozens of unrealistic and unnatural rules in order to take our place in life, I would appreciate a little evidence. My own belief is quite the opposite: that nearly all attempts by schoolteachers to force such 'criteria' upon children have only minimal effects, and that those of us who learn one version or another of the exploiter's dialect do so in exactly the same way as we learn to speak in the first place, by incorporating what we hear and read into the body of data from which we abstract our productive rules (whether this be by analogical induction, as old-fashioned linguists supposed-and suppose-or by some novel and undescribable innate rule-forming mechanism, as is popularly believed today). Some few people, particularly girls and immigrants' children, who were hard up for models to imitate (and television has reduced the number of these very considerably) may have attempted to make use of the schoolteachers' rules. And most of these rules, except for the few which can be stated as simple ad hoc conditions on surface ill-formedness (e.g. don't say ain't or it's me), are difficult to apply in the form given by the textbooks. But I'd still like evidence to replace guesses.
Consider now a proposition from Chapter 2 (p. And if it refers, it may be held that it refers to a group of persons or to a concept; but to say it 'refers to the office or position' leads one into the problem of distinguishing it from *Bobby wants to be the papacy. But these are really ancient difficulties.
There are many different views current on the nature of deep structure or 'the deep level', but L's is among the popular ones (14): 'Each interpretation represents a unique set of relationships on the deep level.' Furthermore, this has some sort of psychological reality: 'They must have some means of representing these interpretations of such sentences in their minds.' Whether this includes or excludes a theory of presuppositions, which do not have to be explicitly represented in deep structure every time they occur, is not clear in this chapter. In Chapter 8, L returns briefly to the topic, and says (142): 'The meaning of a sentence is represented in terms of a structure provided by constituent-structure rules having the form of rules of symbolic logic', and (143) 'there is nothing meaningful which cannot be comprehended' (by every native speaker?) Still no mention of presuppositions. It is equally impossible to find out how certain other problems are to be handled. There seems to be no indication of how the universal quantifier fits in, or of how quantity is dealt with, in general-though apparently it will involve conjoining of 'singular noun phrases having different referential indices' (48)-or of exactly how expressions of duration of time are to be handled in a pure propositional function scheme (without, e.g., the special time operators of Prior 1957). I whiled away a half-hour last night as I was going to sleep trying to deal with the opening words of the Gettysburg Address, and finally gave up. But Chapter 2, on the whole, is a goodish chapter.
At the beginning of Chapter 3, L presents the well-known Chomskyan doctrine on the innateness of language universals. No one doubts (18) 'that children are biologically disposed to acquire a language'-at least I have encountered no doubters. What does seem doubtful is that 'the structural properties that all languages have in common' are so peculiar and unpredictable that only a theory of special creation will account for them. If they are NOT peculiar, then it becomes a nearly hopeless task to decide which of them have survived by genetic evolution (wired in), which by cultural evolution (acquired), and which will inevitably be invented anew every time a child learns its first language.
The rest of Chapter 3 leads up to the presentation of a simple constituent wife and wrench, I will agree are reducible, e.g. to the equivalent of 'a nondoctor who assists at childbirth' and 'a tool for turning nuts and square-or hex-headed bolts by leverage'.) Objects of nature such as birds, animals, trees, fruits, flowers etc. can be CLASSIFIED, but ANY sufficient set of features for identifying a particular species is as good (linguistically, if not biologically) as any other. The next step after a feature specification for sparrow is a feature specification for D. T. Langendoen. The semantics of words for objects whose nature and identity are independent of culture is a quite different thing from the semantics of the anthropocentric part of vocabulary. Sparrow cannot be considered a shorthand substitute for a more explicit description in quite the same way that wrench or uncle or a hundred must be. It may be a 'mistake to identify these features with classes of objects and properties of the physical world' (37), but it is also a mistake to consider hexagons any more a part of the physical world than chiliagons, or to consider centaur to be 'definable in terms of semantic features that are employed elsewhere'. Centaur is, in fact, a clearly reducible term which can (unlike sparrow) be perfectly specified as 'a mythical being portrayed as having a human body from the waist up grafted on to a horse's body from the withers on back'. No features are necessary-only words.
It is perfectly true that, in the he/she opposition, he is the unmarked term (38); but it is certainly NOT true that Someone1 said that he1 was sick or My cousin1 said that he1 was sick does not commit the speaker to the presupposition that the someone or cousin in question is male. its three values are supposed to be strictly the three states of matter-gas, liquid, solid. Now it is true that drink in English requires a liquid object, but pour does not (Pour out some flour). There is, in English and some other languages, a class of substance-names that behave in some respects like liquids, but in others like solids (sand, dust, oatmeal, lime, fertilizer, rice etc.) A purely chemical criterion won't work. But, in general, the problem with selectional features is their near universality. Why is it a grammatical fact, rather than a fact of nature, that animals may drink but tables don't, or that water may wash things clean but mud won't?
The proposition that the 'entire semantic content' of verbs and adjectives 'is expressible in terms of selectional features' (44) sounds impressive, but it is never made to mean very much. In part it seems merely a matter of definition, and in part it may be a reformulation of the old notion that the meaning of a word is the contexts in which it may occur (this, however, would equally allow NOUNS to be entirely definable in terms of their selectional features-if verbs and adjectives are specified first). But Langendoen goes further (50), saying that 'verbs ... only impose components of meaning on noun phrases'. As it stands, this seems to claim that The man came is exactly synonymous with The man who came, and REVIEWS4 in general that propositions are identical with terms. Even if we add the existential quantifier, this account seems inadequate, though it is used in Chapter 6 to provide the basis for a Bach-style deep structure.
Langendoen correctly points out (46, after Aristotle, Categories 6b6-9) that certain terms are inherently relative (tall, long, deep etc.)-i.e., that Lake Erie is shallow means (or is to be derived from?) Lake Erie is shallower than the other Great Lakes; Bobby is small means Bobby is smaller than other boys his age; etc.
How to make referential indices work is a problem anyhow, but 'to assume that each noun in the lexicon has associated with it a referential index ... which is free to take on the values 1, 2, 3' (48) is certainly not going to help, since nouns as such cannot refer at all; only Noun Phrases are capable of representing terms, i.e. referring. And clearly such NP's as the man are always derived by deletion from expressions like the man we just mentioned or the man who came in or something of that sort (cf. p. 139). The whole discussion raises several problems without really solving any. For instance, if embedded sentences are to have referential indices, why is it that two of them conjoined are always it, never them, though 'it' may be those facts? Thus (cf. L's 4.39), The professor had forgotten that it was Founder's Day and that classes had been called off, but later he remembered it (or those facts). If the two S's are disparate enough, it begins to sound odd, but them will never be right: He had forgotten that his wife was away and that ice melts at 0? C., but later he remembered *it/*them/both facts. requires the most machinery to generate, while the one which seems most unnatural and stilted (5.24) requires the least. Why should this be so? Is it merely a matter of length? (I.e., is the shortest version, no matter how difficult to achieve, the most highlyvalued, and the longest version the least?) I don't think so. For instance, 5.26 to me sounds worse than 5.23 (though 5.27 and 5.25, which differ in the same way, sound equally good). And this appears to be often the case; the variant ('synonymous sentence', 'paraphrase' or whatever) which rolls easiest off the tongue is the one which requires the greatest number of transformations, while that which comes hardest and sounds least normal takes the fewest. Some explanation of this fact should be found (though I am not blaming L for failing to look). See also below, on sentences 8.1-5 and 8.6-7.
Pages 68-78 bring up some questions about relative clauses, but overlook others. On 69, for instance, L remarks that 'the relative pronoun deletion transformation is not satisfied by structures in which the relative pronoun stands for the subject of the relative clause', although his examples (cf. 5.53) suggest a counter-instance: I just spoke to the man everyone hopes will oppose the mayor. This might be handled by stating the condition differently: 'to be deleted the relative pronoun must stand between two NP's' (actually we need a little more restriction than that, but this rule will work better than L's). But there is another type of relative subject-deletion which is attested from early Modern English times right on down to contemporary colloquial American varieties from many parts of the country: (a) There's a fellow here wants to see you; (b) It was Mr. Smith ordered the book. Sentences of these patterns turn up in conversation and in fictional dialog very commonly. Both are normal for me, and occur also in questions: (a) Is there somebody here wants to see met and (b) Was it you ordered the book? or Were you the one ordered the book? Note that progressives in (a)-type frames regularly delete be, following the be-deletion rule of pp. 69-70: There's a fellow here smoking grass, but It was Mr. Smith was talking with him. Here deleting the second was yields a different sense.
I will save space throughout this review by omitting all MERE disagreements on grammaticality of examples. But I will note that in only about 1% of all examples (4 out of 400, more or less) did I find sentences grammatical which L objected to, and in only about 4% (15 of 400) did I object to sentences which he accepted. He comes much closer to speaking my dialect than many other linguists do.
A semantic explanation is offered for the rejection of extraposed relative clauses-'if the clause, if extraposed, could be mistaken for a modifier of the object NP'; thus 5.74 *The car also ran into the tree which hit the lamppost. But this won't do. Note *The man also ran into the tree who hit the lamppost; here mistaken reference is impossible, but the sentence is just as bad. Similarly, reversing L's 5.69 makes a deviant sentence, though apparent ambiguity is not the reason: *The witness held the key to the prosecution's case who disappeared. Possibly the mere distance between antecedent and relative is a factor.
In 5 The next few pages deal with reflexivization, and here I don't know of anyone who has yet found a way to handle all the facts. The first point L deals with is the fact which (in Greek or Latin grammars) is expressed by saying that reflexive (and reciprocal) pronouns cannot occur in the nominative case. Here the restriction given is that the coreferential NP to be reflexivized must be in the same clause as its antecedent. Of course, if you translate 5.104 The man1 reassured himself1 that he1 was in control and 5.106 1l thought that I1 had behaved myself into Latin, the he and I will become reflexive pronouns, since as subjects of infinitives they will be accusative (not nominative). These cases might be handled as L treats similar English sentences (5.108 and 109), with the 'infinitival clause separation transformation'. However, the Latin rule has to be different, since reflexive pronouns may occur as objects in subordinate clauses with finite verbs and non-identical subjects, e.g. secum, se, and sibi in the following, where the forms in -rem are 1st person singular: Vir1 mihi persuasit ut se1cum abirem 'The man1 persuaded me to go off with him1';
... ut se2 spectarem '... to watch him1'; ... ut pecuniam sibi1 darem '... to give money to him1', etc.
Another difficulty with the English rule has to do with copulative sentences, e.g. I shot him1 because I knew hei was George P. Jones. Here, if one accepts the view that George P. Jones is an NP and has reference, the rules would say first to pronominalize and then to reflexivize, yielding I shot him because I knew he was himself. This is a grammatical sentence, but it is not a synonymous one. But reflexive sentences are also a nuisance in cases of conjunction reduction (88-95), e.g. Harry shaves himself and so do I. Here it is obvious that shave myself has been deleted, even though myself is not formally or referentially identical with himself. Conversely, when the reference is identical, deletion is impossible: Harry hit himself and I hit him, too. The legend to Fig. 6.1 (p. 99) introduces a limitation on the grammar, namely that any P which is a noun or adjective in the ordinary view must be dominated by an S introduced by rule (e), whereas verbs (real or abstract) can be the topmost P, dominated only by S. If there is no other verb for this P, it must be the verb be. Look again at the labeled bracketing (Fig. 6.4) The following pages hybridize Ross-Lakoff abstract verbs with a Fillmore case-grammar structure. This leads to an apparent need for modification of rule 6.1 (a). If each of the NP's must be labeled (e.g., as 'agent', 'instrument', or 'result'), the structure of the grammar seems to be different-unless, perhaps (though L never suggests this), the labels are to be supplied from the features attached to the lexical entry for the P (here 'use'). This would, I suppose, imply a short list of universal labels or 'roles' which would have to be attached to every P (except perhaps to concrete nouns?), specifying the possible NP's which could be related to it. This might be a pretty good idea, though it appears to exclude the utilization of a 1965 Aspects-type C.S. rule.
In the next few pages Langendoen discusses Lakoff's (1965) 'inchoative' and 'causative' predicates, noting (112) the fact that some adjectives yield only causatives (e.g. wet), others both causatives and inchoatives (e.g. red/redden), others have no plain adjectival form (e.g. melt). But he does not note or explain, any more than Lakoff did, the odd fact that there are virtually no adjectives which yield only inchoatives and lack causatives. Check the de-adjectival verbs in -en: 21 of them-deaden, madden, sadden, roughen, toughen, gladden, blacken, quicken, liken, cheapen, dampen, sharpen, sweeten, frighten, hearten, fasten, chasten, moisten, fatten, flatten, liven-are normally only transitive-causative; 26 occur as both transitive-causatives and (many of them infrequently) as intransitive-inchoatives: broaden, redden, widen, harden, freshen, lengthen, strengthen, weaken, waken, thicken, sicken, darken, deepen, ripen, loosen, worsen, lessen, soften, straighten, lighten, brighten, tighten, whiten, smarten, shorten, hasten; of these 26, only freshen, worsen (136, n. 5), and hasten seem to be more acceptable as intransitives.
In the discussion of passives, a rather sweeping statement occurs ( L's point is illustrated by 8.1-5, which are rearrangements of a single sentence. 8.1 is The rumor that that the report which the advisory committee submitted was suppressed is true is preposterous, which L says is 'perfectly E-grammatical'. Here I beg to differ; I believe that everyone's grammar of English contains a surface constraint forbidding two consecutive unstressed instances of that, whether that-clause types like both of these, or relatives. Here's another quotation (141-2): 'In order to produce comprehensibly the deep structure underlying sentences 8.1-8.5, the extraposition transformation must be applied at least once.' As a balance to this, examples 8.6 and 8.7 are designed to show that extraposition sometimes makes sentences less comprehensible because it has the effect of increasing self-embedding. 8.7 reads: It proves that it's true that Tom's thinking that it would be a good idea for him to show that he likes it here that he's told everyone he's staying. (Here the last that-clause has been extraposed from the beginning of the sentence in 8.6). But this does not agree with L's definition of self-embedding on the preceding page (nor with any other that I know of). Obviously the trouble with 8.7 is the presence of too many that's which could be interpreted on first hearing as introducing the extraposed subject: in fact, each one except the first could be so interpreted, and the error of choosing the second or third cannot be detected until you reach the last one.
